Volume 32
Issue 3 Summer 1992
Summer 1992

The Public Trust Doctrine and Community Values in Water
Helen Ingram
Cy R. Oggins

Recommended Citation
Helen Ingram & Cy R. Oggins, The Public Trust Doctrine and Community Values in Water, 32 Nat.
Resources J. 515 (1992).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol32/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

Helen Ingram and Cy R. Oggins*

The Public Trust Doctrine and
Community Values In Water
The increasinguse of water markets in the western United
States as a means to reallocatewater to serve emerging water uses is
raisingimportant problems of protecting ecological and community
values. A modern version of the public trust doctrine is emerging to
protect the nonmaterialvalues that are poorly reflected in market
decisions. This paper reviews the historic roots of the trust doctrine
and its contemporary applicationin court decisions and state law.
The values at stake are discussed along with some case examples of
ongoing water conflicts including rural-to-urbanwater transfers in
Arizona. The paper concludes with an evaluation of the possibilities
and limitationsof the public trust doctrineas a means through which
law can evolve to serve changingsocietal values.

INTRODUCTION
Water policy, water management and water law in the western
United States are in a time of transition and change. So too are the waters
that flow through, lie under and even fall upon western lands. At present,
few surface water and groundwater sources remain unappropriated.
Rapid growth in the population, size and industrial base of urban centers
in the American West is placing additional strains on the quantity and
quality of these waters. Competition and conflict are increasing because
not enough water is available (at current rates of consumption) to satisfy
all the demands and responsibilities for existing historic agricultural uses,
for new and emerging municipal and industrial uses, for Indian reserved
water rights, for environmental and recreational uses, and for the future of
communities established around a particular use of water. Meanwhile, the
traditional solution to meeting new and expanding demands for water in
the West-increasing the available water supply by building new dams
and water projects to capture, store and deliver water-is no longer
*The authors are respectively, Director, Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona and Coastal Program Analyst, California Coastal Commission, San Francisco, California.
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acceptable due to the high cost and usually negative environmental
impact of these projects. With contemporary emphasis favoring economically efficient solutions to water supply and demand problems, the reallocation of water rights through water markets has become an increasingly
important issue in political, administrative and legal decisionmaking processes and institutions.
The prevailing trend during the past decade of water market
activity has been a movement of water from agricultural uses to municipal
and industrial uses. This movement has often been accompanied by the
physical transfer of water from rural to urban areas. The use of water markets to reallocate water for emerging uses, however, raises important
problems of protecting the ecological and social values that are largely
underrepresented in market transactions. As a result, many western states
have passed legislation requiring an administrative or judicial review of
all new applications to appropriate water (and in some states to transfer
existing water rights) to determine whether or not the proposed applications are "in the public interest."
Paralleling the development in public interest protection is an
increasing recognition of the beneficial use of leaving water in situ for fish
and wildlife, recreational, aesthetic and water quality purposes. This
notion is a direct challenge to the century-old prior appropriation doctrine, the basis of contemporary western water law. The prior appropriation doctrine traditionally requires that water first be diverted from the
waterway and then be put to beneficial use-a practice which "both in its
inception and current application, fails to address or protect public 1interests in fisheries, recreation, environmental quality, and clean water."
In response to the evolution in public values, a modern-day version of the public trust doctrine is emerging to protect the nonmaterial values that are poorly reflected under the prior appropriation doctrine in
general, and in water market decisions in particular. This modern public
trust doctrine, which derives from constitutional, statutory, and commonlaw sources, 2 has evolved significantly from its ancient roots and has
expanded even further since it was first reintroduced by Professor Joseph
Sax in 1970. 3 In recent years, the doctrine has played a significant role in
law in the western states of Alaska, Idaho, Monshaping natural resources
4
tana and Washington.

1. R. Johnson, Water Pollutionand the PublicTrust Doctrine,19 Envtl. L. 487,512 (1989) [hereinafter Johnson, Water Pollution].
2. C. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of
the Traditional Doctrine,19 Envtl. L. 425,426 (1989) [hereinafter Wilkinson, Headwaters].
3. J. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68
Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970) [hereinafter Sax, Judicial Intervention].
4. M. Blumm, PublicPropertyand the Democratizationof Western Water Law: A Modern View
of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 Envtl. L. 573, 574 (1989) [hereinafter Blumm, Modern View].
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This paper examines the public trust doctrine in light of the contemporary evolution in public values. The paper reviews the historic roots
of the trust doctrine, examines the doctrine's application in contemporary
case law, and analyzes its incorporation into western water policy. The
authors discuss public values at stake including instream flows, environmental quality and community welfare. The conflict between the prior
appropriation doctrine and the public trust doctrine is examined as courts,
legislatures and administrative agencies seek to find a balance between
public and private interests in water. This conflict is illustrated with some
case examples of ongoing water problems, particularly the rural-to-urban
water transfer issue in Arizona. The paper concludes by evaluating the
possibilities and limitations of the public trust doctrine as a means
through which law can evolve to serve changing societal values.
ROOTS OF THE TRUST DOCTRINE
The historic roots of the public trust doctrine are often traced back
to Roman law. Under Roman law, certain natural resources were considered common property to be used by all citizens. For example, the Institutes of Justinian state "[tihe things which are naturally everybody's are:
air, flowing water, the sea, and the seashore." 5 In addition, Roman law
treated navigable waters and their associated uses-particularly commerce and fishing--in a different manner than nonnavigable public or private watercourses. Roman law6 sought to preserve use of navigable
waterways for the public benefit.
In the course of his extensive scholarly research into the development of the trust doctrine, Wilkinson found references to "public values in
water" in Chinese water law of 249-207 B.C., in the ancient and traditional
customs of the people of Nigeria, in Islamic water law, in the laws of medieval Spain and medieval France, in the Spanish and Mexican laws and
institutions present in the New World, and in the values and traditions of
many Native American Indians. 7 Spanish water law, codified in Las siete
partidasdel sabio rey don Alfonso, was first institutionalized on the North8
American continent in the Recopilaci6n de leyes de los reynos de las Indias.
Not only did Spanish legal code attempt to balance individual or small
group interests with the larger community interest, it also recognized that
water differed from other natural resources.
5. Institutes 2.1.1 (P.Birks & G. McLeod trans. 1987). The Institutes of Justinian is an elementary treatise on the Roman law first issued in A.D. 533 (Black's Law Dictionary, 719 (5th ed.
1979)).
6. Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 3, at 475,
7. Wilkinson, Headwaters,supra note 2, at 429-30 (citations omitted).
8. For a general discussion of Spanish water law and its New World applications, see M.
Meyer, Water in the Hispanic Southwest: A Social and Legal History 1550-1850, at 21,106-11
(1984). (Las siete partidasconsists of 4 vols and was compiled in Madrid in 1789).
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[CIlear distinctions were made between public and
private property. Property rights were recognized as
absolute, propiedadperfecta, as long as they did not
infringe upon the rights of others, in which case they
were considered propiedad imperfecta. Because of the
vagaries of nature, dominion over water was considered more temporary than permanent, and its use was
subject to the intervention of the state. A man might
allow his crops to rot in the field while his neighbor
went hungry ... but he could not waste his water if his
neighbor's fields were dry.9
Similarly, water to many Native American Indians is associated
with both community and spiritual values, and its use is regarded as
much more than a property right.
There has been a lot said about the sacredness of our
land which is our body; and the values of our culture
which is our soul; but water is the blood of our tribes,
and if its life-giving flow is stopped, or it is polluted,
all else will die and the many thousands of years of our
communal existence will come to an end.1 u
Aspects of the Justinian notion of common ownership appeared
in English common law with the advent of Magna Carta in 1215.11 The
particular rights guaranteed by Magna Carta enlarged the public's interests in navigable waters. 12 Wilkinson sees this English notion of jus publicum or public rights of use-the notion that the shores and submerged
beds of navigable waters were held in trust by the English Crown for the
benefit of all people-as
the most direct source of the traditional American
13
public trust doctrine.
While acknowledging the Roman and English Common law origins, Sax finds the proper source of today's legal public trust doctrine in
the later traditions of the commons as expressed in 11th century regional
French law:
The public highways and byways, running water and
springs, meadows, pastures, forests, heaths and rocks

9. Id. at 108.
10. Wilkinson, Headwaters,supra note 2, at 430 (quoting Frank Tenorio, Governor of the San
Felipe Pueblo in American Indian Lawyer Training Program, Inc., Indian Water Policy in a
Changing Environment, 2 (1982)).
11. H. Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony?, 30
R. Mtn. Min, L. Inst. 17-1 (1984) [hereinafter, Dunning, Discord orHarmony].
12. B. Cohen, The Constitution,the Public Trust Doctrine,and the Environment, 1970 Utah L.
Rev. 388-89 (1970).
13. Wilkinson, Headwaters,supranote 2, at 430.
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...are not to be held by lords... nor are they to be
than that their people
maintained ... in any other way 14
them.

may always be able to use

Medieval French customary law had "the striking advantage of
putting developed expectations, rather than formalities such as title ownership, at the center of attention"1 5 This focus on established expectations
is essential to expanding the scope of the public trust doctrine to cover
community values-a topic discussed in greater detail below.
THE TRUST DOCTRINE IN EARLY AMERICAN WATER LAW
A State Trust
Whereas in England all authority over navigable waterways was
retained in the Crown, in the United States title to the beds of navigable
waterways passed to new states. Title to the use of the overlying waters,
however, was neither absolute nor inalienable. For instance, states relinquished their right to regulate commerce in waterways to the federal government by agreeing to the dictums of the Constitution's Commerce
Clause. In addition, each state's authority to allocate water in navigable
waterways was subject to the government's navigation servitude, which
"allows the United States to condemn land, including state land, up to the
16
high water mark without being required to pay just compensation."
Thirdly, early case law laid the foundations for the concept that the states
held title to the waters in, and the lands under, navigable waterways subject to a public trust; the states, therefore, had an obligation to act as stewards for the public interest as the public interest was defined at the time.
From these early rulings arose the notion that the public trust doctrine
imposed additional obligations on the states, separate from federal obligations covered by the commerce clause and the navigation servitude.
Early Case Law
Several early and frequently cited cases examine this trust obligation. In Arnold v. Mundy,17 the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the
state could not deed away title to oyster beds underlying navigable waterways because the state held these beds in trust for the public benefit.
[Bly the law of nature, which is the only true foundation of all social rights.., by the civil law, which formerly governed almost all the civilized world... [and]
14. M. Bloch, French Rural History 183 (1966), as cited in Joseph Sax, Liberating the Public
Trust Doctrinefrom Its HistoricalShackles, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 185,189 (1980) [hereinafter Sax,
Liberating].
15. Sax, Liberating,supra note 14, at 192.
16. Wilkinson, Headwaters,supra note 2, at 449.
17. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
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by the common law of England... the navigable rivers
where the tide ebbs and flows, the ports, the bays, the
coasts of the sea, including both the water and the land
under the water, for the purposes of passing and
repassing, navigation, fishing, fowling sustenance, and
all other18uses of the water... are common to all the
people.
Similarly, in Martin v. Waddell,19 United States Supreme Court
Chief Justice Taney ruled that the shores, rivers, bays, arms of the sea, and
them are held as a public trust for the benefit of the whole
the land under
20
community.
The notion that state legislatures could and perhaps should allocate resources to benefit the public trust was first articulated in IllinoisCentral Railroadv. Illinois.21 This case, which Sax regards as the "Lodestar in
American Public Trust Law," 22 can be summarized as follows. In 1869, the
Illinois state legislature granted to the Illinois Central Railroad more than
1000 acres of land underlying Lake Michigan. This grant covered an area
extending one mile from the shoreline into Lake Michigan and one mile
along the central business district of Chicago-an area:
[that] is as large as that embraced by all the merchandise docks along the Thames at London; is much larger
than that included in the famous docks and basins at
Liverpool; is twice that of the port of Marseilles, and
nearly if not quite equal to the pier
23 area along the
water front of the city of New York.
Four years later, the legislature rescinded the grant and was subsequently sued by the Railroad. In ruling on the case, the United States
Supreme Court held that Illinois held title to the lands underlying its navigable waters. The Court, however, expressly distinguished these lands
from other lands by asserting that the title in question "is a title held in
trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the
waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein
freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties." 24 The Court
also applied the public trust doctrine to affirm the legislature's repeal of
the original grant.
A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a
State has never been adjudged to be within the legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 78.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
Id. at 413.
146 U.S. 387 (1892).
Sax, Judicial Intervention, supranote 3, at 489.
Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,454 (1892).
Id. at 452.
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be held, if not absolutely void on its face, as subject to
revocation. The State can no more abdicate its trust
over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so
as to leave them entirely under the use and control of
private parties... than it can abdicate its police powers
in the administration
of government and the preserva25
tion of the peace.
This opinion "left no doubt that26the traditional public trust doctrine imposes obligations on the states."
EVOLVING RANGE AND SCOPE
Protected Resources
The traditional public trust doctrine has commonly been applied
only to the waters and beds of navigable waterways. The importance of
protecting these waters for the benefit of the public can be observed in the
Oregon Court of Appeals ruling in Morse v. Oregon Division of State
Lands.27
The severe restriction upon the power of the state as
trustee to modify water resources is predicated not
only upon the importance of the public use of such
waters and lands, but upon the exhaustible and irreplaceable nature of the resources and its fundamental
importance to our society and to our environment.
These resources can after all be spent only once. Therefore, the law has historically and consistently recognized that rivers and estuaries once destroyed or
diminished may never be restored to the public and,
accordingly, has required the28highest degree of protection from the public trustee.
In English law, the test of navigability was whether the water in
question was affected by the ebb and flow of the tide-all inland waters
above the flow of the tide were considered nonnavigable. Because many
inland waterways in the United States--e.g., the Mississippi and Columbia Rivers-are navigable beyond the reach of the tide, new criteria were
developed in the United States. In the 1870 case of The Daniel Ball,29 the
navigability test was extended to encompass all waters "navigable in
fact."
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 453.
Wilkinson, Headwaters,supra note 2, at 425.
581 P.2d 520 (Or. App. 1978), affd, 590 P.2d 709 (Or. 1979).
Id. at 524.
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
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Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are
navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible
of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways
for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may
be conducted in
30 the customary modes of trade and
travel on water.
State courts have further expanded the list of resources covered
by the trust doctrine. Wilkinson, 3 1 Rogers 3 2 and Johnson 3 3 cite several
examples of natural resources which have over time been singled out in
state court decisions as being held in trust by the state and protected by
the trust doctrine. These include: (1) nonnavigable tributaries of navigable
waters in California 34 (but not nonnavigable waterways, such as an artificial reservoir, in the absence of some impact on navigable waters); 35 (2) the
shorezone of California's navigable but nontidal Lake Tahoe; 36 (3) land
conveyed to the University of Illinois "as a forest, wild and plant-life
reserve, as an example of landscape gardening and as a public park;" 37 (4)
beaches above high tide in New Jersey; 38 (5) private lands around obstacles or dangerous rapids in Montana streams;3 9 (6) wetlands and state
parks in Massachusetts; 40 (7) all waters, not just navigable waterways, in
Idaho,4 1 Montana, 4 2 and (under the auspices of a trust responsibility to
conserve and protect both the present water supply and future state water
needs) North Dakota; 43 and (8) public lands with special importance for
the health, welfare and safety of the public. 44 Thus the modern public
30. Id. at 563.
31. C. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 269
(1980) [hereinafter Wilkinson, PublicLand Law].
32. W. Rodgers, Environmental Law: Air and Water 159-60 (1986).
33. Johnson, Water Pollution, supra note 1, at 494-95.
34. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
35. Golden Feather Community Ass'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 199 Cal. App. 3d 402,
244 Cal. Rptr. 830 (6th Dist. 1988), aff'd, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1276, 257 Cal. Rptr. 836 (3d Dist.
1989).
36. State v. Superior Court of Placer County, 625 P.2d 256 (Cal. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
865 (1981), reh'g denied, 454 U.S. 1094 (1981).
37. Parsons v. Walker, 328 N.E.2d 920, 925 (Ill. App. 4 Dist. 1975).
38. See, e.g., Neptune City v. Avon-by-the Sea, 294 A.2d 47,54 (N.J. 1972); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1978); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d
355 (N.J. 1984).
39. Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P2d 1088 (Mont. 1984); Montana
Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984).
40. Robbins v. Dep't of Public Works, 244 N.E.2d 577 (Ma. 1969),
41. Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985). The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that "The
state holds all waters in trust for the benefit of the public and 'does not have the power to
abdicate its role as trustee in favor of public parties."' Id., 448 n.2 (quoting Kootenai Envtl.
Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085,1088 (Idaho 1983)).
42. Galt v, Montana Dep't of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 731 P.2d 912-15 (Mont. 1987).
43. United Plainsmen v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Commission, 247 N.W.2d
457 (N.D. 1976).
44. Wilkinson, Public Land Law, supranote 31.
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trust doctrine, at least as interpreted by the courts in several states,
appears to have extended beyond its original water-based scope to protect
the public's interest in a wide range of natural resources.
Protected Interests
Perhaps in response to changing public values, federal and state
courts have also expanded the range of interests protected by the public
trust doctrine. States traditionally held their navigable waters in trust for
commerce, navigation and fisheries. 4 5 Several recent cases have firmly
broadened the scope of the public trust doctrine beyond navigation, commerce, and fishing. For example, in Marks v. Whitney, 46 the California
Supreme Court redefined the state interest in navigable waters and tidelands by stating:
The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs.
In administering the trust the state is not burdened
with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of
utilization over another. There is a growing public recognition that one of the most important uses of the
tidelands-a use encompassed within the tidelands
trust-is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may .serve as ecological units for
scientific study, as open space, and as environments
which provide food and habitat for birds and marine
life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate
of the area. It is not necessary to here define precisely
47
all the public uses which encompass tidelands.
This case is also important because it specifically gave public individuals standing to request that the court examine any cases in which the
public trust could be harmed.
The trust doctrine was also extended in two other important California rulings: National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine
County46 (which relied on the public trust doctrine to preserve trust lands
for ecological study, open space, fish and wildlife habitat and scenic
resources; and to protect the public interest in fishing, hunting, boating
and swimming) and United States v. State Water Resources Control Board4"
(which interpreted the public interest to encompass water quality issues
45. See, e.g., Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
46. 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
47. Id. at 380.
48. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
49. 182 Cal. App. 3d. 82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1st Dist. 1986). In Bay Delta, United States
Bureau of Reclamation and California Department of Water Resources diversions into the
California Central Valley Project and the State Water Project were limited for water quality
reasons after new information revealed that diversions were having an adverse affect on the
Southern Delta.
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relating to water diversions affecting San Francisco Bay and the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta). Other cases in which public trust concerns
were expanded include: Neptune City v. Avon-By-the-Sea 50 (which guaranteed recreational access for bathing, swimming and sunbathing in New
Jersey); United Plainsmen v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Commission5 l (which included water conservation); and Kootenai Environmental
Alliance v. PanhandleYacht Club52 (which protected "navigation, fish and
wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty and water quality" 53 in Idaho). This latter case later became the basis for the Idaho
Supreme Court ruling in Shokal v. Dunn54 which incorporated public interest criteria into Idaho statutory law.
In Light of NationalAudubon
In 1983, the California Supreme Court dealt directly with the issue
of accommodating changing societal and environmental values in
National Audubon. The case arose from a decision made by the California
Water Commission (predecessor to the present-day State Water Resources
Control Board) in 1940 to grant the City of Los Angeles an appropriative
water right to divert most of the flow from four of the five streams feeding
Mono Lake. In the following years, the City's municipal water supplierthe Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP)-diverted a
yearly average of 90,000 acre-feet, which comprised approximately 17 percent of the City's municipal water supply.
The resulting 45 foot drop in the lake level between 1940 and 1982
represented a loss of more than 50 percent of the lake volume. This in turn
led to a substantial increase in lake salinity, the threat of irreversible damage to the lake's unique ecosystem and food chain, and a significant
decline in the lake's capacity to support populations of migratory birds
that use the lake as a resting, feeding and nesting area.55 The California
Water Commission granted the city's permit despite potentially harmful
environmental effects, because the state recognized domestic water use as
the preferred use. The Commission stated:

50. 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972).
51. 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
52. 671 P,2d 1085 (Idaho 1983).
53. Id. at 1095.
54. 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985). The public interest criteria included the criteria stated in
Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983) as well as: (1)
access to public waters; (2) assuring minimum stream flows; (3) discouraging waste; and (4)
encouraging water conservation.
55. For further discussion of the environmental effects of water diversions on Mono Lake
see Dunning, Discordor Harmony,supra note 11; National Research Council, The Mono Basin
Ecosystem: Effects of Changing Lake Level (1987); D.Botkin, et. al., The Future of Mono Lake
(Water Resources Center, University of California at Riverside, 1988).
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It is indeed unfortunate that the City's proposed development will result in decreasing the aesthetic advantages of Mono Basin but there is apparently nothing
this office can do to prevent it. The use to which the
City proposes to put the water under its Applications
... is defined by the Water Commission Act as the
highest to which the water may be applied.5 6
In 1979, the National Audubon Society filed suit in superior court
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from the LADWP diversions 57 on
the theory that the shores, bed and waters of Mono Lake were protected
by a public trust. In its subsequent decision, the California Supreme Court
relied on the public trust doctrine to hold that (1)either the state courts or
the state water agency must reconsider the Commission's original permit
decision and (2) in general, the state must consider public trust values
when allocating title to state water resources unless the state legislature
specifically states otherwise. The Court held:
The state has an affirmative duty to take the public
trust into account in the planning and allocation of
water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible. Just as the history of this state shows that
appropriation may be necessary for efficient use of
water despite unavoidable harm to public trust values,
it demonstrates that an appropriative water rights system administered without consideration of the public
trust may cause unnecessary and unjustified harm to
trust interests .... [T]he state must bear in mind its
duty as trustee to consider the effect of the taking on
the public trust, and to preserve, so far as consistent
with public interest, the uses protected by the trust....
Once the state has approved an appropriation, the
public trust imposes a duty of continuing supervision
58
over the taking and use of the appropriated water.
Thus, according to Rodgers, 59 the California Supreme Court
made specific pronouncements on the public trust doctrine including: (1)
its purposes ("the scenic views of the lake and its shore, the purity of the air,
and the use of the lake for nesting and fishing by birds");6 0' (2) the resources
covered by the trust (nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters);6 1 (3) the
56. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709,729 (Cal. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
57. Id. at 716.
58. Id. at 728.
59. Rodgers, Environmental Law, supra note 32, at 157.
60. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
61. Id. at 721.
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process obligations (requiring the trustee who makes resource allocations to
"take the public trust into account");6 2 (4) the restraintson the trustee("there
must be an attempt... to avoid or minimize any harm to those interests
[protected by the public trust]"); 63 (5) legislative discretion to impair trust
uses64 and (6) to relinquish trust protection" (if consistent with the purposes
of the trust or specifically stated otherwise by the legislature); and (7) the
lowering of constitutional barriersto property reallocationsadvancing evolving
trust purposes ("the state is not confined by past allocation decisions which
in light of current knowledge or inconsistent with curmay be incorrect
66
rent needs").
POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER EVOLUTION
OF TRUST DOCTRINE PROTECTIONS
Preservation of Instream Flows
State legislators throughout the western United States have
debated the pros and cons of implementing instream flow protection for
important rivers and streams. This struggle ended in several states with
the passage of comprehensive instream flow protection legislation. 67 By
1986, 16 western states had incorporated some instream flow protection
into their water rights systems. 69 More specifically, nine states declared
and recrestatutorily that use of instream flows to support fish, wildlife
69
ational purposes is a legitimate and beneficial water use.
Controversy over instream flow protection, however, is far from
over. Policies that permit and encourage the practice of leaving water in
the stream often conflict with current demands and increasing competition for scarce water resources. Under the traditional prior appropriation
doctrine, property rights to the use of water were granted only if water
was diverted from a stream and put to a beneficial use. This rule provided
62. Id. at 728.
63. Id. at 712.
64. Id. at 727.
65. Id. at 723.
66. Id. at 728.
67. S. Shupe, The Enforcement of State Instream Flow Rights: Legal. Technical, and PoliticalChallenges, Instream Flows and the Public Trust 53 (Proceedings of the Third Annual Western
States Water Council Conference on "Instream Flows and the Public Trust, Los Angeles, California, September 11-12,1986).
68. These states (and the dates when instream flow protections were incorporated) are:
Alaska (1980); Arizona (1941); California (1985); Colorado (1973); Hawaii (1982); Idaho
(1974); Kansas (1980); Montana (1973); Nebraska (1984); Nevada (1969); North Dakota (1977);
Oregon (1955); Texas (1977); Utah (1986); Washington (1969); Wyoming (1986).
69. R. Ausness, Water Rights, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protectionof Instream Flows,
1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 407, 420 (1986). These states are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Montana,
Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Texas and Washington. Id.
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objective proof of an intent to appropriate the water.70 Water left in the
stream, meanwhile, was reserved for future appropriation, and was often
regarded as a waste of a valuable resource. As testified by one critic of
instream flows, notions of the wastefulness of such practices still linger:
California's present use of water already exceeds its
developed supplies. Moreover, the state's population
is projected to increase by an additional 10.2 million
people by the year 2010. The state as we know it cannot
exist if its major rivers were required to be returned
71 to
their natural condition, to flow unused to the sea.
The "first in time, first in right" rule that underlies the prior
appropriation doctrine leads to conflict in other ways. For example,
although some states now issue water rights for instream flows, these
water rights are usually junior to already-established diversion rights. A
senior water rights holder, therefore, could potentially render junior
instream rights meaningless by diverting all or most of the water from its
natural channel.
The modern public trust doctrine has been promoted as a means
to protect thosepublic values which depend on maintaining minimum
instream flows. 72 There is precedent for this notion. For example, Sax
states: "The law is that water flows to benefit those uses that advance the
contemporary public interest... (and) the public interest, as now perceived, demands the retention and augmentation of instream water supplies."73
Similarly, Dunning suggests that the doctrine has "its greatest
potential as a tool for an aggressive approach to environmental restoration
... [and] restoration of instream flows." 74 In addition, courts have recognized the special status of water. For instance, in a 1908 opinion in Hudson
5 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
County Water Co. v. McCarter,7
Holmes held that:
[Flew public interests are more obvious, indisputable,
and independent of particular theory than the interest
of the public of a state to maintain the rivers that are
wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by
70. Id.
71. A. Littleworth, The Public Trust vs. The Public Interest, 19 Pac. L. J. 1201, 1203 (1988).
72. R. Johnson, Public Trust Protectionfor Stream Flowsand Lake Levels, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
233 (1980).
73. Sax, JudicialIntervention, supranote 3, at 475.
74. H. Dunning, Instream Flows, the Public Trust, and the Futureof the West 31 (Paper presented to the Conference on "Instream Flow Protection in the Western United States: A Practical Symposium," University of Colorado School of Law, Boulder, Colorado, March 31-April

1,1988).
75. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
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such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public
welfare may permit for the purpose of turning them to
more perfect use. This public interest is omnipresent
wherever there is a state, and grows more pressing as
population grows.... The private right to appropriate
is subject not only to the rights of lower owners, but to
the initial limitation that it may not substantially
diminish one of the great foundations of public welfare
and health. 76
The public trust doctrine has also been called upon in California
to limit the City of Los Angeles's diversions from the waters of the tributaries of Mono Lake in both National Audubon and California Trout Inc. v.
State Water Resources Board.77 The Idaho Supreme Court stated that the
public trust doctrine takes precedent even over vested water rights in that
state. 78 Rivers and estuaries in Oregon are afforded the highest degree of
protection from events which could destroy or diminish them. The constitutions of the states of Alaska, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, North
Dakota, and Wyoming also expressly declare that water belongs to the
public, while those of California,
Idaho, Nebraska, Texas and Oregon
79
imply state ownership of waters.
The Related Issue of Water Quality
Continued preservation of many of the public values protected
under the public trust doctrine depends on maintaining the quality of a
protected water source as well as the flow. In some cases these two concerns are entwined. For example, regulations protecting water quality traditionally focus on controlling the types and concentrations of pollutants
which enter the nation's surface waters and groundwater. Johnson, however, sees the reverse precept as being equally valid-that the extraction of
water from streams for irrigation and other purposes contributes to the
degradation of water quality by reducing the assimilative capacity of the
source stream or lake.go As stated by Sax, "there is no legal or logical difference between poisoning fish by what you put in the water and suffocat81
ing them by what you take out."
Johnson argues that the trust doctrine can be expanded to include
water quality, and that diversions that harm water quality should be limited. He states that such actions are not unconstitutional "takings"
76. Id. at 356.
77. 207 Cal. App. 3d 585,255 Cal. Rptr. 184 (3d Dist. 1989).
78. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983).

79. Blumm, Modern View, supra note 4, at 576-77 (citations omitted).
80. For a clear and detailed treatment of this line of thought, see Johnson, Water Pollution,
supra note 1.
81. J. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 Envtl. L. 473 (1989) [hereinafter
Sax, Limits].
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because "no one, not even prior appropriators, has or can acquire a legal
right to pollute public waters." 82 Precedent also exists for including water
quality as a legitimate concern of the trust doctrine. In one sense, states
have always had a trust responsibility to regulate water quality. According
to Johnson, "[firom the beginning, the public trust doctrine has protected
navigation, commerce, and fisheries. Protection of fisheries necessarily
implies protection of water quality."83 While the doctrine has seldom been
used explicitly to protect water quality, several related cases apply, the
most frequently cited cases being Kootenai Environmental Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club84 in Idaho and United States v.State Water Resources Control Board85 in California.
Protection of Community Values
The expansion of public trust protections in water from traditional uses such as navigation, commerce and fishing to modem day values of environmental quality, fish and wildlife protection, recreation and
aesthetics illustrates that water has uses beyond its economic value. Further, this nonmaterial value is not limited to public values in common natural resources. For example, Maurice Kelso argues that water is important
to strong democratic institutions, or agrarian fundamentalism, which sets
it apart from ordinary market mechanisms; 8 6 Brown and Ingram show
that water is also closely bound up with community perceptions of security, opportunity, participation and well-being;87 and Wilkinson promotes
the notion that water is "one vital element in the ecological and socio-eco88
nomic communities of which we are a part."
Traditionally, political communities form to provide certain basic
services and to protect certain basic rights that citizens cannot secure by
acting alone. In many cases, citizens are mutually dependent on a limited
supply of natural resources. According to Sax, "[b]ecause the survival of [a
community] depends upon the continuing ability of their resources to sustain them, their relationship is inevitably one of mutual dependence, common enterprise and joint responsibility." 89 To this end, government and its
82. Id. at 487.
83. Id. at 488.
84. 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983).
85. 182 Cal. App. 3d. 82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1st Dist. 1986).
86. M. Kelso, The Water is Different Syndrome, or What is Wrong With the Water Industry
(Paper presented to the American Water Resources Association, San Francisco, California,
November 9,1967).
87. F. L. Brown & H. Ingram, Water and Poverty in the Southwest (1987).
88. C. Wilkinson, Aldo Leopold and Western Water Law: Thinking Perpendicularto the Prior
Appropriation Doctrine,24 Land & Water L. Rev. 1, 36,(1989) [hereinafter Wilkinson, Thinking

Perpendicular].
89. J. Sax, Thinking About the Future of Water Law: Some Guidepostsfor a New Era 49 (Draft,
1989).
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agents have a duty to function as "trustees" of the resources which keep
communities together.
Before the emergence of the prior appropriation doctrine, decisions about water were commonly based on the community or public
interest rather than individual interest. For instance, Maass and Anderson
found that maintaining equity, popular control and realizing social justice
were more important in allocating water than economic efficiency in the
six irrigation communities that they studied.90 Threats to the allocation
system were perceived as threats to a community's well-being or its way
of life.9 1 With contemporary emphasis on water markets, economic efficiency, and rural-to-urban water transfers, these community values are
again being threatened. A recent study conducted in Arizona measured
losses associated with water transfers as perceived by community leaders;
the results showed that communities in areas of origin expected to be
severely destabilized by the effects of the transfer of local water supplies
to entities outside the community. Over 88 percent of the leaders of communities located in areas of origin agreed that the communities' losses
were such that they could not be recompensed. 92
Established expectations provide the conceptual link to public
trust introduction. According to Sax, "the root values that inhere in the
maintenance of an established community have much in common with
the established expectations that underlie the recognition of private property rights." 93 For Sax, protecting the public trust includes insulating communities from the effects of rapid debilitating change brought on by water
rights transfers:
The central idea of the public trust is preventing the
destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in
common but without formal recognition such as title.
The function of the public trust as a legal doctrine is to
protect such public expectations against destabilizing
changes just as we protect
94 conventional private property from such changes.
While most state's attorney generals have neither adopted nor
rejected these public trust arguments, the basis for such assertions exist in
90. A. Maass & R. Anderson,... And the Desert Shall Rejoice: Conflict, Growth, and Justice
in Arid Environments (1978).

91. H. Ingram, et. al., ReplacingConfusion With Equity: Alternativesfor Water Policy in the Colorado River Basin, in New Courses for the Colorado River 177-99 (Gary Weatherford & F. Lee
Brown, eds., 1983).
92. C. Oggins & H. Ingram, Does Anybody Win? The Community Consequences of Rural to
Urban Water Transfers:An Arizona Perspective (Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, Issue Paper No. 2, 1989).
93. Sax, Liberating,supranote 14, at 187.

94. Id.
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many legislative statutes and state court decisions. At present, sixteen
western states have adopted some form of public interest review of water
appropriations and/or water transfers. 95 While it is not altogether clear
what criteria are to be applied in such reviews, there is some precedent for
considering environmental and community values. For example, the
Idaho Supreme Court in Shokal v.Dunn,9 6 while incorporating the spirit of
the Mono Lake case, stated that an application for an appropriative permit
or a water rights transfer could be rejected "if the proposed use is such...
that it will conflict with the local public interest where the local public
interest is defined as the affairs of the people in the area directly affected
by the proposed use."
"Affairs" of the people could conceivably include the notion of
preserving culture and way of life. That the courts might eventually be
sympathetic to such a broad construction of public interest and public
welfare is foreshadowed by the opinion of United States District Judge
Encinias in a decision over a proposed change of an irrigation right to provide water for a ski resort and guest ranch. One excerpt from his opinion
is particularly pertinent to this discussion:
The second main line of argument pits economic values against cultural values. Here, it is simply assumed
by the Applicants that greater economic benefits are
more desirable than the preservation of a cultural identity. This is clearly not so. Northern New Mexicans
possess a fierce pride over their history, traditions and
culture. This region of northern New Mexico and its
living culture are recognized at the state and federal
levels as possessing significant cultural value not measurable in dollars and cents. The deep-felt and tradition-bound ties of northern New Mexico families to the
land and water are central to the maintenance of that
culture.
While these questions seem, at first far removed from
the simple question of the transfer of a few acre feet of
water, the evidence discloses a distinct pattern of
distruction [sic] of the local culture by development
which begins with small, seemingly insignificant
steps. I am persuaded that to transfer water rights,
devoted for more than a century to agricultural purposes, in order to construct a playground for those
who can pay is a poor trade, indeed. I find that the proposed transfer of water rights is clearly contrary to the
95. Oggins & Ingram, supranote 92,at 42-55.
96. 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985).
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public interest and, on that separate basis, the Application shall be denied.97
Community Losses From Rural-to-Urban Water Transfers
In the American West, water and conflict are rarely far apart.
Elwood Mead, an early water administrator, wrote in 1903 that west of the
hundredth meridian water was often "the subject of an unending warfare,
which does not change in character whether it is waged with shotguns
and shovels on the banks of ditches or by means of injunctions in the
courts." 98 While the battleground today may have shifted from headgates
to courthouses and legislatures, the arguments are as emotional as before.
Many of these latter-day arguments concern rural-to-urban water transfers.
For example, in 1905, Mary Austin wrote passionately of the
social and environmental costs involved in the transfer of water from the
Owens Valley to the City of Los Angeles-an event made famous in the
movie "Chinatown." 99 This transfer, the first in a series of events which
100
led to the 1983 California Supreme Court decision in National Audubon,
"stands both as a pragmatic lesson and as a vivid symbol to rural communities across the West of the conseq uences that can result when community values in water are ignored."' 0 Meanwhile, in 1989, after 10 years of
legal and other costs for all participants estimated at 17 million dollars, the
Public Service Board (PSB) of El Paso, Texas had not received any water
from its controversial proposal to import groundwater from southern
New Mexico. 102 Similar conflicts over water transfers are occurring all
over the western states as large metropolitan areas such as Las Vegas,
Denver, Phoenix and Tucson look to rural areas for secure supplies of
water. Public values at stake include not only the economic development
of urban areas, but also culture, way of life, the environment, and the

97. In the Matterof Howard Sleeper, et al., No. RA 84-53, letter to counsel (Rio Arriba County
Dist. Ct. N.M. 1985), reversed on other grounds, Ensenada Land & Water Association v. Sleeper
(N.M. Ct. App. 1988). Decision was reversed because at the time of the hearing, New Mexico
did not statutorily protect community or public welfare values.
98. E, Mead, Irrigation Institutions 187 (1903).
99. "Every considerable city in the State is or is about to be confronted by a water problem.
But what is to be gained by the commonwealth if it robs Peter to pay Paul? Is all this worthwhile in order that Los Angeles should be just so big?" (M. Austin, San Francisco Chronicle,
Sept. 3,1905, as cited by W. Kahrl, Water and Power, 107 (1983).
100. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
101. C. Wilkinson, "Values in Western Water: A History of Dominant Ideas," 5 (Western
Water Policy Project Discussion Series Paper No. 1. Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law, Boulder, Colorado, 1990).
102. Albuquerque Journal, Feb. 2, 1989 (Southwest edition).
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future of rural communities with established expectations built around

traditional and primarily agricultural water uses.
The rural-to-urban water transfer experience in Arizona provides
an excellent example of how public values can be damaged when normal
legislative protections are removed. The Arizona Groundwater Management Act of 1980 established the conditions for widespread water transfers. The Act was passed to convince Congress that Arizona had a
comprehensive plan for effectively managing state water resources so that
the state could receive federal funding for the Central Arizona Project. The
Act required that large metropolitan areas located in Active Management
Areas (AMAs) prove an assured 100-year water supply for future growth
and development and reach safe yield or an end of groundwater overdraft
by the year 2025. This created an incentive for cities to secure long-term
supplies in rural areas outside the boundaries of the AMAs, at the expense
of both rural communities with established expectations and the environment. Bruce Babbitt-who, as Governor of Arizona in 1980, helped oversee passage of the Act and who has recently lobbied for rural communities
damaged by large-scale water transfers-described the unforeseen consequences of the Act as follows:
In 1980... our groundwater code unshackled the cities, giving them complete freedom to buy "water
farms" and transport the water anywhere in the state.
The result was a frenzied stampede to purchase farms
in western Arizona. In La Paz County along the Colorado River, private speculators and cities have purchased 40 percent of the privately owned land [in
order to obtain the water rights associated with the
land as per Arizona water law]. To some it seems like a
rerun of the movie "Chinatown" in which greedy promoters took rural communities into bondage, shattering their dreams of growth and independence.
The Arizona experience is not, however, an argument
against water transfers. What it does prove is that complete freedom for cities can threaten the very existence
of some conveniently situated rural communities that
happen to be well-endowed with water. In the absence
of oversight and regulatory approval, economic Darwinism will carry the day-the large and powerful
the
will prevail. Big cities will inexorably squeeze
10 3
water and the life out of small communities.
It is becoming increasingly apparent that current western water
law and market-oriented behavior are incapable of solving water conflicts
103. Id.
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in an equitable manner. It is not surprising, therefore, that many leading
contemporary water scholars, policymakers, and administrators are calling for the reform of not only the prior appropriation doctrine, but all state
water law including court decisions, statutes, administrative practices,
and funding mechanisms as well. 104 According to Babbitt, the question for
Westerners now is how to design a legal system that will bring about necessary water5 transfers while protecting rural communities and other pub10
lic values.
To date, the judiciary has used the public trust doctrine to protect
community and environmental values where administrative and political
institutions are ineffective. Reform of the classic system "will not come
easily,"106 and continued oversight and regulatory approval is needed to
prevent unforeseen consequences such as those that occurred in Arizona.
To this end, the trust doctrine can be a valuable tool.
A NOTE REGARDING TRUST DOCTRINE DETRACTORS
The public trust doctrine has its share of detractors among legal
scholars, resource managers and politicians. 10 7 Lazarus, for example,
argues that the expanding use of the trust doctrine beyond its traditional
range and scope is both unnecessary and tantamount to unprincipled
judicial activism. 108 He states that the public values the trust doctrine was
re-created to protect are already protected by the law of standing, by nuisance law, by property law, by administrative law, and by "the most fundamental source of governmental authority to prevent needless
environmental harm and related risks to human health and welfare"police power.1°9 To Lazarus, the public trust doctrine is a "patch [on] the
emerging fabric of natural resources law" 110 and a judicially-created
"legal fiction [designed] to avoid judicially perceived limitations or consequences of existing rules of law."11 He adds:
104. See, e.g., Wilkinson, Thinking Perpendicular, supra note 88 and Sax, Limits, supra note 81.
105. B. Babbitt, New Laws Needed to Slake West's Thirst, Albuquerque Journal, Aug. 10,1988,
at A9.
106. Wilkinson, Thinking Perpendicular, supra note 88, at 38.
107. Two frequently cited critics of the public trust doctrine are R. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine,
71 Iowa L. Rev. 631 (1986) [hereinafter Lazarus, Questioning] and J. Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A Comment on the Public Trust Writings of Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning and Johnson, 63 Denv. U. L. Rev. 565 (1986). For a listing of other critics, see Johnson, Water
Pollution, supra note 1, at 487. The intensity of the debate between proponents and opponents
of the trust doctrine can also be observed in Blumm, Modern View, supra note 4, and J. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: the Public Trust in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 Envtl. L. 527 (1989)
[hereinafter Huffman, Fish].
108. Lazarus, Questioning,supra note 106, at 633.
109. Id. at 656-65.
110. Id. at 715.
111. Id. at 656.
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[The] tremendous expansion in the nature of sovereign
authority and the degree of governmental oversight
...
undercut[s] any meaningful role for the public trust
doctrine in promoting governmental authority. The
implications of this expansion question the central
premise of the trust doctrine's origins-that the doctrine provides a needed legal basis to ensure public
accountability for governmental
112 decisions that
adversely affect the environment.
Lazarus concludes by finding that modern use of the trust doctoward a bygone era, at a
trine "amounts to a romantic step backward
113
time when we face modem problems."
Like Lazarus, Huffman believes that the use of the public trust
doctrine is a step backward. Huffman compares the management and
allocation of scarce water resources to the situation existing in Garrett
Hardin's tragedy of the commons, where the solution is private property
and the "trend represented by the public trust doctrine is simply a return
to the commons." 114 Huffman also criticizes the trust doctrine on the
grounds that it frustrates reasonable and legitimate investment-backed
expectations in the ownership of water rights thus "producing unexpected outcomes concerning the ownership and transfer of trust
resources." 115 This, Huffman concludes, threatens liberty and is therefore
undemocratic.1 16
Wilkinson and Blumm rebut the arguments of Lazarus and Huffman for numerous reasons, but primarily because the arguments rely
heavily on federal law, while the reach of the modem public trust doctrine
is a function of state law.117 Blumm also stresses that the trust doctrine is a
democratizing force because it promotes access either directly to trust
resources or indirectly to the decisionmakers with authority to allocate
those resources, and in doing so prevents the monopolization of trust
resources by a minority of private interests. 118 The argument that the trust
doctrine thwarts legitimate investment-backed expectations is similar to
the arguments posed by proponents of water markets-that public interest review of the third party impacts of water transfers increases the transaction costs of market transfers an indeterminate amount because "buyers
and sellers cannot be certain about what [amount of water] can be transferred before transfer arrangements are researched hydrologically, ecolog112. Id. at 679.
113. Id. at 715-16.
114. Huffman, Fish, supra note 106, at 582-83.
115. Id. at 532.
116. Id. at 554.
117. Wldkinson, Headwaters, supra note 2, at 466-67; Blumm, Modern View, supra note 4, at
593-94.
118. Blumm, Modern View, supranote 4, at 573.
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ically, socially, and economically. " 119 According to Emel and Webb,
however, "if the rhetoric of market proponents regarding the social welfare necessity of fully pricing or valuing all impacts of such transfers is to
be taken seriously, transaction costs should be high."120 Similarly, if legitimate investment-backed expectations depend upon the destabilization of
public expectations or the monopolization of trust resources without the
specific approval of state legislatures, perhaps such investment-backed
expectations ought to be frustrated.

CONCLUSION
This paper reviews the recent and perhaps surprising growth in
the importance, range and scope of the public trust doctrine in western
water law and policy. While part of the doctrine's rapid evolution is
ascribed to the intellectual stature of the legal minds who have interpreted
this doctrine-e.g., Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning, Johnson and Blumm-probably more important is the increasing threats to the environmental and
natural resources to which the doctrine is most often called upon to protect. Intensive water development has damaged natural systems including fisheries habitats, wetlands, and riparian areas. Water market transfers
have the potential of depleting minimum flows. Further, water markets
threaten to undermine the basis of communities from which water is
being removed.
State political and administrative mechanisms are not yet
equipped to deal with the regulation of water markets. The mission of
water agencies and the skills of their staff are designed to press the state's
case for water development in the United States Congress and among constituents. Current laws framed to protect noneconomic and nonmaterial
interests are ineffective. For instance, the very sophisticated environmental impact statement process developed to sensitize public agencies and
decision makers does not reach into private market actions. While legislative innovations are being proposed, they are often quite controversial
and become bottled up in the legislative process. The lack of effective state
action has provided a powerful impetus for courts to step in to protect the
broad public interest.
Legal doctrines standing at the forefront of social change are susceptible to attack and controversy (witness Brown v. Board of Educationand
Roe v. Wade). Many commentators believe that values conflicts are better
handled by legislatures directly elected by the public. There are impediments, however, that prevent legislators from mirroring public sentiment
119. J. Emel & E. Webb, The Tyranny of Non-Decision and Small Decisions, 79 Water Resources
Update, 22 (1989).
120. Id.
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in the water issue. The issue is highly complex and is often seen in technical and legal terms; thus, state legislatures have historically deferred to
federal agencies or to the courts. It is not surprising, therefore, that few
strong state statutes regulating water transfers have been adopted.
Despite the judicial activism involved, courts are likely to be in
the forefront of change. The most likely future for the public trust doctrine
is slow evolution and cautious adoption. Without legislative encouragement, however, judges are going to be reluctant to place bold limitations
on those property rights which conflict with public values. Further, courts
cannot be expected to stand alone in defense of environmental and community values. Policymakers need to recognize that public sentiment in
favor of environmental values and quality of life is becoming stronger in
the United States as well as in Europe. Strong public support will provide
the context for both legislative and court action.

